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I. THE ISSUE
In 1949, neurologist Antonio Egas Moniz was awarded a Nobel Prize in
physiology/medicine for his contributions toward the development of a treat-
ment for mental illness whereby the prefrontal cortex is severed from the rest of
the brain by surgical instrument.  Six decades on, lobotomy is viewed as an
unwarranted, drastic, and crude treatment.  A similar progression in notions of
acceptable physical intervention to aid the mentally ill may be underway.
Today, the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to a mental patient
when the patient is a danger to himself or others, or might be rendered compe-
tent to stand trial, is a process that is widely accepted by the mainstream medi-
cal community and the courts.  Even the United States Supreme Court has
addressed the issue, finding in Washington v. Harper that “there is little dispute
in the psychiatric profession that proper use of [antipsychotic] drugs is one of
the most effective means of treating and controlling a mental illness likely to
cause violent behavior.”1  However, this acceptance reflects a current and, per-
haps, temporary equilibrium among weighty medical and legal issues, includ-
ing informed consent, competency, the right to refuse treatment, medical ethics,
medical malpractice, parens patriae, due process and the right to privacy.
Patients who receive antipsychotic drugs may experience serious, adverse
side effects.  As Justice Stevens wrote in a concurring opinion in Harper:
[T]hese drugs both ‘alter the chemical balance in the patient’s brain’ and can cause
irreversible and fatal side effects. . . .  Prolixin acts ‘at all levels of the central ner-
vous system as well as on multiple organ systems.’  It can induce catatonic-like
states, alter electroencephalographic tracings, and cause swelling of the brain.
Adverse reactions include drowsiness, excitement, restlessness, bizarre dreams,
hypertension, nausea, vomiting, loss of appetite, salivation, dry mouth, perspiration,
headache, constipation, blurred vision, impotency, eczema, jaundice, tremors, and
muscle spasms.  As with all psychotropic drugs, prolixin may cause tardive dyskine-
sia, an often irreversible syndrome of uncontrollable movements that can prevent a
person from exercising basic functions such as driving an automobile, and neurolep-
* Judge Chuck Weller serves in the Second Judicial District Court, Family Division,
Washoe County, Nevada.
1 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 226 (1990).
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tic malignant syndrome, which is 30% fatal for those who suffer from it.  The risk of
side effects increases over time.2
The harsh consequences that antipsychotic drug therapy visits on some
mental illness sufferers invites speculation that, one day, responsible people
will look back on the involuntary administration of such drugs to these vulnera-
ble patients with the same sense of horror that people today feel when they
consider the era of lobotomy.3  Such considerations underscore the obligation
of legislatures and courts to ensure that the mentally ill are subjected to forced
medication only when their constitutional due process rights have been
protected.
II. THREE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS LAY
THE FOUNDATION
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the forced
administration of antipsychotic drugs to civilly committed mental patients.
There are, however, two lines of United States Supreme Court cases relating to
the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications to mentally ill per-
sons in other circumstances.  One line involves the administration of medica-
tion to prisoners in an effort to modify their conduct in prison.  The other line
involves the administration of medication to pretrial detainees in serious crimi-
nal cases in an effort to render them competent to stand trial.
A. The Prisoner Case: Washington v. Harper
Walter Harper found himself in a Washington State prison in 1982, after
his parole on a robbery conviction was revoked when he assaulted two nurses
at a hospital.4  Harper had a history of mental illness and was a diagnosed
schizophrenic.5  He treated his illness with antipsychotic medication and his
care providers noted that his condition deteriorated to the point that he became
violent when he did not take the drugs.6  Eventually, Harper refused to continue
taking his medication.7  The State sought to medicate Harper against his will.8
Harper filed a civil rights action challenging the prison policy that authorized
forced medication.9
In Washington v. Harper, the Court ruled that the State was entitled to
forcefully medicate Harper, only if his substantive and procedural due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were satisfied.10  The Court framed the
substantive issue as “what factual circumstances must exist before the State
2 Id. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting PHYSICIAN’S
DESK REFERENCE 1639-40 (43d ed. 1989)).
3 For examples of jurists opposed to forced administration of antipsychotic drugs, see id. at
238-41 (Stevens, J., with whom Brennan, J. and Marshall, J. join, concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Riggins v. State, 860 P.2d 705, 706 (Nev. 1993) (Springer, J., dissenting).
4 Harper, 494 U.S. at 214.
5 Id. at 213-15.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 214.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 217
10 Id. at 220-22.
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may administer antipsychotic drugs to the prisoner against his will,” and the
procedural issue as “whether the State’s nonjudicial mechanisms used to deter-
mine the facts in a particular case are sufficient.”11
On the substantive issue, the Court found that the prisoner has a liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic medication.12
The State has an interest in prison safety and security and an obligation to
provide medical treatment consistent with the prisoner’s medical needs.13
Washington’s policy requires that a psychiatrist make the substantive determi-
nation that an inmate suffers from a mental disorder; is gravely disabled or
poses a likelihood of serious harm to himself, others or their property; and that
the inmate should be treated with antipsychotic drugs ordered or approved by a
psychiatrist.14  The Court upheld this policy, ruling that “given the require-
ments of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to
treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs
against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treat-
ment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”15
The Court also found that Washington had adopted a procedure that satis-
fied the prisoner’s procedural due process rights.16  That procedure entitles an
inmate who refuses to voluntarily take the medication to a hearing.17  The
inmate is entitled to at least twenty-four hours notice of the hearing and may
not be medicated during the notice period.18  The notice must indicate the
inmate’s diagnosis, the basis for that diagnosis, and an explanation of the
necessity for medication.19  The hearing panel is composed of a psychiatrist, a
psychologist, and the Associate Superintendent of the prison system’s psychiat-
ric facility.20  None of the members may be, at the time of the hearing, involved
in the inmate’s diagnosis or treatment.21  Before ordering involuntary medica-
tion, the hearing panel is required to find that the inmate suffers from a mental
disorder and is gravely disabled or dangerous.22  The Court specifically found
that due process does not require that the prisoner to be involuntarily medicated
also be found incompetent.23
The inmate has the right to appear at the hearing, to have the assistance of
a lay adviser, to present witnesses and other evidence, and to cross-examine
opposing witnesses.24  Minutes are kept and the inmate is entitled to a copy of
those minutes.  The inmate may appeal an adverse decision to the Superinten-
11 Id. at 220.
12 Id. at 221-22.
13 Id. at 221-26.
14 Id. at 226.
15 Id. at 227.
16 Id. at 236.
17 Id. at 215-16.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 215-16.
23 Id. at 222.
24 Id. at 216.
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dent within twenty-four hours.25  The inmate may seek judicial review of an
adverse ruling by the Superintendent by petition or extraordinary writ.26  If
involuntary medication is administered, periodic reviews are required.27
B. The Competency to Stand Trial Cases: Riggins v. Nevada and United
States v. Sell
David Riggins was arrested for murder in Las Vegas during 1987.28  He
had a history of psychosis and of being treated by antipsychotic drugs.29  Rig-
gins asked the trial court to order the suspension of his medication because the
“drugs infringed upon his freedom and that the drugs’ effect on his demeanor
and mental state during trial would deny him due process.”30  The court denied
Riggins’s request.31  He was medicated each day of his trial, following which
he was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.32
In Riggins v. Nevada, the United States Supreme Court considered the
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to Riggins in an effort to render
him competent to stand trial.33  The Court reiterated that a prisoner detainee
can be forcefully medicated in accordance with the procedures approved in
Washington v. Harper upon findings “that treatment with antipsychotic medi-
cation was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives,
essential for the sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others.”34  Alter-
natively, the Court ruled that forced medication might be justified by a finding
that the State “could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins’ guilt or innocence
by using less intrusive means.”35  The Court found that the record was insuffi-
cient to “support a conclusion that administration of antipsychotic medication
was necessary to accomplish an essential state policy” and, accordingly,
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.36
Charles Sell was once a dentist.37  In 1997, he was charged with submit-
ting fictitious insurance claims to Medicaid for payment.38  The court sent him
for medical examination to determine his competency to stand trial.39  Sell had
a long history of mental illness,40 and a psychiatric evaluation determined him
to be incompetent to stand trial.41  The medical staff recommended that Sell
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 129 (1992).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 130.
31 Id. at 131.
32 Id. at 131.
33 Id. at 129.
34 Id. at 135.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 138.
37 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
38 Id. at 170.
39 Id. at 171.
40 Id. at 169.
41 Id. at 171.
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take antipsychotic medication.42  Sell refused.43  The medical staff asked the
court for permission to administer antipsychotic drugs involuntarily.44
In United States v. Sell, the Court addressed the focused question of
whether the government may administer antipsychotic drugs to a pretrial
detainee, against his will, solely to render him competent to stand trial for non-
violent offenses.45  The Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause requires four findings before medication can be forced in such circum-
stances: (1) “important governmental interests are at stake”; (2) “administration
of the drugs is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand
trial” and “administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have side
effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist
counsel in conducting a trial defense”; (3) “any alternative, less intrusive treat-
ments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results”; and (4) “adminis-
tration of the drugs is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical
interest in light of his medical condition.”46
The Sell court also reaffirmed the holding in Washington v. Harper, in
accordance with which forced medication is permissible when the safety of the
mentally ill individual or others is at issue and appropriate substantive and pro-
cedural due process requirements are met.47
III. WASHINGTON V. HARPER GOVERNS FORCED ADMINISTRATION OF
ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS UPON CIVILLY COMMITTED
MENTAL PATIENTS
Although none of these cases involved a civilly committed mental patient,
it is clear that the standard to be applied in determining whether it is permissi-
ble to force administration of antipsychotic drugs upon a civilly committed
mental patient is described in Washington v. Harper: “For another thing, courts
typically address involuntary medical treatment as a civil matter, and justify it
on these alternative, Harper-type grounds . . . If a court authorizes medication
on these alternative grounds, the need to consider authorization on trial compe-
tence grounds will likely disappear.”48
Courts that have addressed the issue have applied the Washington v.
Harper standard to the involuntary administration of medication to patients
confined in psychiatric facilities:
The governmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar in material
aspects to that of running a prison.  Administrators have a vital interest in ensuring
the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients’ own
safety.  Thus, we apply the Harper standard to this case.49
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 169.
46 Id. at 180-81.
47 Id. at 178.
48 Id. at 182-83.
49 Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Jurasek v. Utah State
Hosp., 158 F.3d 506, 511 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying Harper standards to civilly committed,
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Mental Health America (MHA), a national organization dedicated to help-
ing people with disabling mental illnesses, endorses Washington v. Harper as a
standard for assessing policies for the involuntary administration of medication
as follows:
Qualified Right to Refuse Treatment.  There are a growing number of effective
treatments for mental health conditions, including psychotropic medications.  How-
ever, all medications pose some risks and many pose quite serious risks to the health
of the persons who take them, particularly when medications are taken for extended
periods to treat chronic illnesses.  For this reason and because of its commitment to
the autonomy and dignity of persons with mental health conditions, MHA strongly
agrees with the judgment of the United States Supreme Court that all persons, even
persons lawfully convicted and serving a sentence of imprisonment, have a right to
refuse medication and that medication may not be imposed involuntarily unless rigor-
ous standards and procedures are met.50
IV. WHAT NEVADA SOURCE AUTHORIZES THE STATE TO ADMINISTER
MEDICATION TO PATIENTS AGAINST THEIR WILL?
Clear statutory authority exists for the determination of when it is appro-
priate to involuntarily treat a criminal defendant to cause him to attain compe-
tency to stand trial or receive pronouncement of judgment.51  In contrast, it is
difficult to locate a statutory authorization for the forced administration of
drugs to a civilly committed mental health patient.  Nevada’s statutory scheme
that governs the involuntary, civil admission of a patient into a mental health
facility, NRS Chapters 433 and 433A, include no clear grant of authority for
forced administration of medication.  No explanation of this omission and con-
trast appears in the legislative history of these chapters.
The law authorizes the court to order the involuntary admission of a men-
tally ill person for the “most appropriate course or treatment.”52  The term
“most appropriate course of treatment” is not defined.  It can be argued that the
fact that a court commits a person for the “most appropriate course of treat-
ment” implies that the court has jurisdiction to order the involuntary medication
of a patient following an involuntary admission.
The law also provides, “The rights of a client enumerated in this chapter
must not be denied except to protect the client’s health and safety or to protect
the health and safety of others, or both.”53  The exception stated in this statute
might be construed as an oblique authorization to deny a patient the right to
refuse medication.
There is no published Nevada Supreme Court decision, Administrative
Code section, or Attorney General Opinion that specifically discusses the
forced administration of drugs to civilly committed mental patients.  The only
mentally ill patients); Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 161-62 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying
Harper to involuntarily committed mental patients).
50 Position Statement 22: Involuntary Mental Health Treatment, MENTAL HEALTH AM.
(Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.nmha.org/go/position-statements/p-36.
51 NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.3981-.4715 (2009).
52 Id. § 433A.310(1)(b).
53 Id. § 433.534(1).
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clear authorities on the subject are the Patients’ Bill of Rights54 and the Divi-
sion of Mental Health and Developmental Services Policy #SP3.1—Involun-
tary Administration of Medication.55
A. Nevada’s Patients’ Bill of Rights
States may grant greater substantive and procedural right to a mental
health patient facing involuntary medication than does federal law and, if so,
state law controls.56  Nevada’s Patients’ Bill of Rights appears to create greater
due process rights than required by federal law by prohibiting the application of
any treatment to any mental health patient without prior express, informed,
written consent.  The law states:
(a) Before instituting a plan of care [or] treatment . . . express and informed consent
must be obtained in writing from:
(1) The client if he or she is 18 years of age or over or legally emancipated and
competent to give that consent, and from the client’s legal guardian, if any;
(2) The parent or guardian of a client under 18 years of age and not legally
emancipated; or
(3) The legal guardian of a client of any age who has been adjudicated mentally
incompetent;
(b) An informed consent requires that the person whose consent is sought be ade-
quately informed as to:
(1) The nature and consequences of the procedure;
(2) The reasonable risks, benefits and purposes of the procedure; and
(3) Alternative procedures available.57
This statute appears to say plainly that no medication can be administered
except upon the informed consent of a patient or guardian.  A limited exception
to this general rule exists for emergency medical treatment “if within a reasona-
ble degree of medical certainty, delay in the initiation of emergency medical
care or treatment would endanger the health of the client.”58  Such emergency
treatment is limited to no more than forty-eight hours and is, accordingly, inap-
plicable to most cases in which forced medication may be appropriate.59
Courts in other states that have enacted similar patients’ bill of rights have
found that a judicial determination of incompetence is required prior to the
involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs.60
A patients’ bill of rights may also carry other implications.  Nevada case
authority establishes that failure to comply with a patients’ bill of rights creates
54 Id. § 433.456-.536.
55 DIV. OF MENTAL HEALTH & DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS., NEV. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., POLICY NO. SP-3.1, INVOLUNTARY ADMINISTRATION OF MEDICATION (2010), availa-
ble at http://mhds.nv.gov/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=36&Item
id=230.
56 Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982).
57 NEV. REV. STAT. § 433.484(1)(a)-(b).
58 Id. § 433.484(1)(d).
59
“The administration of psychotropic drugs under these circumstances shall not extend
beyond a period of forty-eight consecutive hours without the consumer’s consent or the
committee and administrative review as detailed in this policy.” DIV. OF MENTAL HEALTH &
DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS., supra note 55, at 1.
60 See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 209 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987); Doe v. Hunter, 667 A.2d 90, 93 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995).
766 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:759
a private cause of action.61  A patients’ bill of rights that establishes a private
cause of action may be construed as a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity
in relation to violations by a government operated facility.62  Mandamus may
be a procedure available to a mental health patient seeking to require the execu-
tive branch to fulfill its obligations under a patients’ bill of rights.63  The
absence of an exception to Nevada’s informed consent requirement applicable
to the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs opens the courts to
such claims.
B. Division of Mental Health and Developmental Services Policy #SP-3.1—
Involuntary Administration of Medication
For more than a decade before 2010, Nevada’s Division of Mental Health
and Developmental Services operated under an internal policy designated as
Policy #2.004 on the involuntary administration of medication.  That policy
included procedural protections to ensure that decisions to forcefully medicate
were neither arbitrary nor erroneous, that such decisions were made by inde-
pendent medical professionals, and that patients were provided with reasonable
notice.64  That policy, however, did not afford patients all of the rights
approved in Washington v. Harper, including such fundamental rights as the
right of a patient to appear and present witnesses at hearings.  The Commission
on Mental Health and Developmental Services addressed this omission on
August 30, 2010, when the Commission drafted and the Administrator
approved Policy #SP-3.1.65  This new policy closely follows the requirements
of Washington v. Harper and marks a substantial advance in the protection of
patient rights.  At the same time, the Division prepared forms for use by mental
health institutions to ensure that a patient’s due process rights are satisfied dur-
ing the process of authorizing involuntary medication.
At the present time, however, Policy #SP-3.1 exists only as a statement of
the practice of the Division of Mental Health and Developmental Services.  It is
anticipated that later in 2011, the Division will attempt to have the policy made
a part of the Nevada Administrative Code.66  It is also significant that this pol-
icy, by its terms, is inapplicable to private mental health institutions.  Still, such
institutions remain obligated to provide services to their patients in a legal man-
ner, and it would be good practice for any such institution to consider the adop-
tion of the Division’s policy and forms.
61 See, e.g., Smith v. Cotter, 810 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Nev. 1991).
62 See, e.g., Mahoney v. Lensink, 569 A.2d 518, 522-26 (Conn. 1990). But see Tex. Dep’t
of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Lee, 38 S.W.3d 862, 864-65 (Tex. App. 2001).
63 See, e.g., E. H. v. Matin, 284 S.E.2d 232, 237 (W. Va. 1981).
64 DIV. OF MENTAL HEALTH & DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS., NEV. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., POLICY NO. 2.004, INVOLUNTARY ADMINISTRATION OF MEDICATION (2007), availa-
ble at http://mhds.nv.gov/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=36&Item
id=230.
65 DIV. OF MENTAL HEALTH & DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS., supra note 55, at 1-2, 6.
66 Although not yet a part of the administrative code, the Division is applying the policy in
all State-operated mental health institutions.
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V. WHICH COURTS SHOULD BE INVOLVED?
The family courts of Washoe and Clark counties have adjudicated the
forced administration of drugs to mental health patients since these courts were
created in 1991.  A recent decision of the Nevada Supreme Court, Landreth v.
Malik, calls into question the jurisdiction of the family courts to make such
adjudications.67  Landreth holds that “the family court’s jurisdiction is limited
to the types of proceedings specified by the Legislature in NRS 3.223.”68  That
statute states that family courts have original, exclusive jurisdiction in any pro-
ceeding “[b]rought pursuant to NRS 433A.200 to 433A.330, inclusive, for an
involuntary court-ordered admission to a mental health facility.”69
It is far from clear that an adjudication of a mental health facility’s petition
for authority to administer medication to a patient against his will is a proceed-
ing specified by the legislature in NRS 3.223.  Any judgment issued by a fam-
ily court on a matter not specified by NRS 3.223 is void, not merely voidable.70
Family courts may have pendant jurisdiction to adjudicate the forced adminis-
tration of medication in those cases in which a determination of the issue is
necessary for the resolution of a proceeding brought for an involuntary court-
ordered admission.71  When civil commitment is not at issue, the family court’s
jurisdiction to adjudicate involuntary medication is uncertain.  As a practical
matter, family courts decide these questions in the jurisdictions where they
exist.
VI. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE COURT?
Washington v. Harper holds that an administrative hearing conducted in
accordance with the requirements of procedural due process is sufficient for the
involuntary administration of medication.72  Due process requires no
mandatory judicial involvement before medication is administered.73  The deci-
sion states:
Notwithstanding the risks that are involved, we conclude that an inmate’s interests
are adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to med-
icate to be made by medical professionals rather than a judge. . . .74
A State may conclude with good reason that a judicial hearing will not be as effec-
tive, as continuous, or as probing as administrative review using medical deci-
sionmakers.  We hold that due process requires no more.75
The National Alliance on Mental Illness, in its policy Involuntary Commit-
ment and Court-Ordered Treatment states:
Involuntary commitment and court-ordered treatment decisions must be made expe-
ditiously and simultaneously in a single hearing so that individuals can receive treat-
67 Landreth v. Malik, 221 P.3d 1265, 1268 (Nev. 2009), reh’g granted (July 22, 2010).
68 Id.
69 NEV. REV. STAT. § 3.223(1)(i) (2009).
70 Landreth, 221 P.3d at 1269.
71 Id. (discussing Barelli v. Barelli, 944 P.2d 246 (Nev. 1997)).
72 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 232-33 (1990).
73 Id. at 228-33.
74 Id. at 231.
75 Id. at 233.
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ment in a timely manner. The role of courts should be limited to review to ensure
that procedures used in making these determinations comply with individual rights
and due process requirements, and not to make medical decisions. . . . Responsibility
for determining court-ordered treatment should always be vested with medical pro-
fessionals, who, in conjunction with the individual, family, and other interested par-
ties, must develop a plan for treatment.76
The court’s role, if judicial review occurs, is to ensure that the patient’s
substantive and procedural due process rights are met.
To ensure the patient’s substantive due process rights, the court must con-
clude that the psychiatrist who recommends forced medication has determined
that the patient is a danger to himself or others.  It is not the court’s role to
determine whether the patient is a danger to himself or others.  Instead, the
court is responsible to make certain that the psychiatrist exercised professional
judgment in deciding that the patient is dangerous.77  This requires a limited
examination to determine there is a basis upon which the psychiatrist rendered
his opinion.78  A presumption exists that the decision made by the professional
is correct.79
To ensure the patient’s procedural due process rights, the court must deter-
mine that procedures adopted in Division of Mental Health and Developmental
Services Policy #SP-3.1 have been followed.80  Such deference, while required,
might be fairly tempered in accordance with Justice White’s observation in
Barefoot v. Estelle: “Neither petitioner nor the [American Psychiatric] Associa-
tion suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future danger-
ousness, only most of the time.”81
VII. CONCLUSION
U.S. constitutional due process requirements for the involuntary adminis-
tration of antipsychotic medications to civilly committed, mentally ill patients
are fairly well settled.  Nevada likely added additional requirements by enact-
ment of its patients’ bill of rights.  Division of Mental Health and Developmen-
tal Services Policy #SP-3.1 appears to satisfy constitutional requirements.
However, there is no clear authorization for the adoption of such a policy in
Nevada law.  Nor do the requirements of the patient’s bill of rights admit any
exception for the involuntary medication of civilly committed mental health
76 Involuntary Commitment and Court-Ordered Treatment, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL
ILLNESS (Oct. 7, 1995), http://www.nami.org/Content/ContentGroups/Policy/Updates/Invol-
untary_Commitment_And_Court-Ordered_Treatment.htm (emphasis added).
77 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982); Morgan v. Rabun, 128 F.3d 694, 697-98
(8th Cir. 1997).
78 Morgan, 128 F.3d at 697-98.
79 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
80 In re Miller, 705 N.E.2d 144, 150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (“[P]rocedural safeguards are not
mere technicalities which may be routinely disregarded . . . they are essential tools to protect
the liberty interests of persons alleged to be mentally ill.”); see also In re Richard C., 769
N.E.2d 1071, 1075-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (involuntary administration of drugs prohibited
where patient was not provided with written information about proposed drugs, as required
by law); In re Nancy M., 739 N.E.2d 607, 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (due process denied by
failure of verdict form to distinguish among three proposed medications).
81 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983).
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patients.  The role of the courts and the identity of the court with subject matter
jurisdiction are also uncertain under existing law.  Legislation is necessary to
address these issues in order to provide protection for the rights of this vulnera-
ble group.
